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Abstract
This Essay will explore the issues and concerns from both the defendant and plaintiff angle,
and from the micro to the macro level. Above all, it hopes to suggest ways in which the EU systems
might be improved to increase fairness and access to justice for both sides. The first three Parts of
this Essay consider the issues from the point of view of defendants in cartel investigations. Part I
looks at concerns regarding the procedural detail of the investigative process, and in particular the
increasing impact of human rights arguments. Part II steps back to focus on more over-arching
concerns, such as the operation of the Commission’s leniency and settlement programs, while
Part III considers fundamental structural issues, such as the broad role played by the Commission
in EU antitrust enforcement. Part IV looks at the debate from the point of view of third-party
claimants for damages, assessing the obstacles to effective damages actions in the EU. This Part
also discusses the possibilities for synergies between the public and private enforcement regimes
and concludes that the Commission would do well to consider the potential benefits of closer
cooperation between the two regimes.
ESSAYS
CARTELS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS FOR DEFENDANTS AND
CLAIMANTS
David Anderson * and Rachel Cuff **
INTRODUCTION
As the level of fines imposed by the European Commission
("Commission") for cartel behavior continues to increase, so
does the concern regarding the fairness and stability of the
procedures used by the Commission to achieve such penalties.
The European Union ("EU") system was developed as an
administrative one, without criminal or individual sanctions, but
the system has shifted over time. The fines imposed by the
Commission have risen to levels that are substantively akin to
criminal penalties, and the introduction of criminal sanctions at
the EU Member State level, and in other major jurisdictions
including the United States and Canada, has had a significant
impact on the position of companies investigated in the
European Union. There has been a creeping criminalization of
antitrust infringement in the European Union,' but its system is
designed with administrative sanctions in mind, and as a result,
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Policy and a version of the Essay is also published in 2010 FORDHAM COMPETITION L.
INST. ch. 10 (Barry Hawk ed., 2010).
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1. Such concerns also arise at the national level, although the focus here remains
upon the European Union ("EU"). In the United Kingdom, for example, courts have
considered that "[i]nfringement proceedings under the Competition Act 1998 are of a
quasi-criminal nature." Crest Nicholson Plc v. Office of Fair Trading, [2009] EWHC
(Admin) 1875, [69] (Eng.).
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386 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 34:385
lacks the rigorous procedural safeguards necessary to ensure due
process in such a regime.
Significant efforts have been made by the Commission's
Directorate General for Competition ("DG Competition") over
recent years to render its processes more transparent and subject
to more internal scrutiny, including the recent publication of
best practice guidelines for antitrust proceedings ("Best
Practices") and guidance on procedures of the Hearing Officers
in antitrust proceedings,2 as well as an explanatory note
regarding its inspection authorization.3 Indeed, these latest
improvements can be seen as just the most recent part of a
longer and very gradual evolution toward better and fairer
administration of competition proceedings that dates from the
establishment of the Hearing Officer post several decades ago.
However, the EU system remains perforated with points of
material procedural unfairness. Although certain issues may not
be of significant individual concern, together they serve to sap
the effectiveness and fairness of procedures that the Commission
has worked hard to establish. Other issues are of more
overarching concern and go to the heart and structure of the
current anticartel enforcement regime at the EU level.
A further layer has recently added to the debate regarding
the underlying fairness of the Commission's antitrust
proceedings, which, it has been argued, operate at times in
breach of human rights. When the Treaty of Lisbon entered into
force on December 1, 2009,4 it set in motion a process that will
lead to the European Union becoming a contracting party to the
2. EUROPEAN COMMISSION DG COMPETITION, BEST PRACTICES ON THE CONDUCT OF
PROCEEDINGS CONCERNING ARTICLES 101 AND 102 TFEU (2010) [hereinafter DG
COMPETITION], available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/
2010_best_practices/best-practicearticles.pdf; EUROPEAN COMMISSION HEARING
OFFICE, GUIDANCE ON PROCEDURES OF THE HEARING OFFICERS IN PROCEEDINGS
RELATING TO ARTICLES 101 AND 102 TFEU (2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/consultations/2010_best-practices/hearing officers.pdf.
3. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EXPLANATORY NOTE TO AN AUTHORISATION TO
CONDUCT AN INSPECTION IN EXECUTION OF A COMMISSION DECISION UNDER ARTICLE
20(4) OF COUNCIL REGULATION No 1/2003 (2008), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/explanatorynote.pdf.
4. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 2010 0.J. C 83/01
[hereinafter TEU post-Lisbon).
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European Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR").5 Accession
negotiations have commenced and, once accession is complete,
the European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR") will be able to
scrutinize all actions of the Commission (and the other EU
institutions) for conformity with the protection of fundamental
rights. However, such protection is likely to be increased even
before accession takes place, as the EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights became binding on EU institutions with the entry into
force of the Treaty of Lisbon. These developments will increase
the level of external scrutiny of the actions of the Commission
and provide another option for potential recourse for individuals
and companies.
Discussion of protection of human rights and the
importance of procedural equity can swiftly stray into the
academic, but such issues and problems are observed by
practitioners on a daily basis. A substantial plaintiffs' bar has not
yet developed in the European Union, and most antitrust
counsel therefore advise both plaintiffs and defendants. This
makes them uniquely placed to comment on the challenges for
claimants and the dangers for defendants.
For defendants in particular, problematic issues can arise
throughout the investigative process, ranging from the "three
feet view" of the detail of raids, documents, and interviews up to
the "thirty thousand feet view" of the Commission's enforcement
structure as a whole.
From a plaintiffs point of view, there are currently too many
procedural obstacles for most to consider suing and too few
incentives for defendants to consider settling out of court. As a
result, few injured companies and consumers threaten to sue or
actually sue, and cartelists are never fully held accountable for
their overcharges. While the Commission continues to work on
reforms to deal with many of these issues, they are currently on
hold pending further consultation on collective redress, so the
opportunity remains at hand to continue considering ways to
improve the private actions system in Europe.
This Essay will explore the issues and concerns from both
the defendant and plaintiff angle, and from the micro to the
5. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR]. The Lisbon Treaty requires that the
European Union accede to the ECHR. TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 4, art. 6, at 19.
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macro level. Above all, it hopes to suggest ways in which the EU
systems might be improved to increase fairness and access to
justice for both sides. The first three Parts of this Essay consider
the issues from the point of view of defendants in cartel
investigations. Part I looks at concerns regarding the procedural
detail of the investigative process, particularly the increasing
impact of human rights arguments. Part II steps back to focus on
more overarching concerns, such as the operation of the
Commission's leniency and settlement programs, while Part III
considers fundamental structural issues, such as the broad role
played by the Commission in EU antitrust enforcement. Part IV
looks at the debate from the point of view of third-party
claimants for damages, assessing the obstacles to effective
damages actions in the EU. This Part also discusses the
possibilities for synergies between the public and private
enforcement regimes and concludes that the Commission would
do well to consider the potential benefits of closer cooperation
between the two regimes.
I. THE DEFENDANT'S VIEW FROM THREE FEET
A. Raids and Inspections
In the midst of an unannounced inspection, right at the
beginning of the Commission's investigation, certain procedural
steps may have an unfair and significant negative impact on a
defendant's position moving forward.
1. Authorization of Inspection
In the European Union, inspections and searches can and
do take place in individuals' homes and cars as well as on
business premises. Despite the exceedingly wide powers of the
Commission when conducting such raids, there is no
independent check available as to whether the raid should be
authorized or how it is conducted. The Commission is able to
self-authorize its raids on business premises and, as discussed
below, the review of authorizations to raid private premises is
restricted.
In practice, the Commission bases the majority of its
decisions to commence an investigation and its decisions to
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conduct a raid on information submitted to it by an immunity
applicant. At this early point in the investigation, such
information has not been subjected to any independent
verification or corroboration. It has not been supported or
challenged by evidence from other parties and can therefore be
considered at best one-sided and at worse unreliable, subjective,
and potentially just plain wrong. The actual decision authorizing
a raid is typically very brief in its scope.
The Commission's discretion to raid a company is very
broad. The ultimate decision to raid is not subject to any
(known) form of internal independent check or external judicial
review prior to the raid and may only be judicially reviewed by
the Court of Justice of the European Union after the raid has
taken place.6 There is no clearly identifiable standard or
evidential threshold that the Commission must reach before a
decision to raid is issued beyond the raid being "necessary,"
although the decision is limited by very general, yet important,
principles of EU law, such as that of proportionality.
The question has been raised as to whether Commission
inspections infringe the general right to privacy.7 Regarding the
right to privacy of natural persons (including individuals such as
CEOs, other directors, shareholders, and employees), Article 21
of Regulation 1/2003 requires prior authorization to be obtained
from a national judicial authority ("NJA") for inspections of
"other premises" (i.e., not business premises).8 However, the role
of the NJA in providing such authorization appears to be limited,
as it "may not call into question the necessity for the inspection
nor demand that it be provided with information in the
Commission's file."9
The jurisprudence of the ECtHR has clarified that the right
to privacy encompasses the privacy of business premises or offices
of legal persons (i.e., companies and other legal entities). o
However, the protection afforded to legal persons under
Regulation 1/2003 is different, as inspections of business
6. In practice, very few companies avail themselves of this rather late and arguably
ineffectual remedial path.
7. ECHR, supra note 5, art. 8.
8. Council Regulation No. 1/2003 on the Implementation of the Rules on
Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty art. 21, 2003 O.J. L 1/1.
9. Id.
10. Niemietz v. Germany, 251 Eur. Ct. H.R. 23, 29-32 (1992).
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premises do not require prior authorization from an NJA. Again,
the only available review is therefore an ex post facto review by
the Court of Justice. As ECtHR jurisprudence has extended the
right to privacy to business premises," it remains to be seen
whether this might pose problems for the authorization and
conduct of Commission inspections in the future.
2. Interviews and Explanations
During a surprise inspection, or "dawn raid," and indeed
throughout an investigation, individuals may be placed in
positions where they risk providing incriminating information
about their own involvement in anticompetitive activity. During a
dawn raid, for example, the Commission (or national authority)
may ask individuals to provide an "explanation" of a document.
In the context of the ongoing investigation, companies may take
a number of steps that risk or entail self-incrimination by the
company or its individual employees, such as (1) making oral
statements in the context of a leniency application, which set out
a "roadmap" of the involvement of both the company and
specific individuals in the cartel; (2) providing evidence in
response to a formal request for information from the
competition authority; (3) making employees available for
interviews (both with external lawyers and with the competition
authority, during the dawn raid and later in the procedure); and
(4) providing documentary evidence (in the context of either a
leniency application or a request for information).
Answering questions and providing information may risk or
entail self-incrimination by the company or its individual
employees. The ECtHR has described the privilege against self-
incrimination as one of the rights that makes up "the very
essence of an applicant's defence rights."12 While this privilege,
and the complementary right to remain silent, are textually
absent from Article 6 ECHR, the ECtHR considers that these
rights are "generally recognised international standards which lie
at the heart of the notion of a fair procedure."13 Privilege against
self-incrimination applies to both natural and legal persons.
11. Soci6t6 Colas Est v. France, 2002-111 Eur. Ct. H.R. 148-49.
12. Jalloh v. Germany, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. 32, 692-93 (2007).
13. J.B. v. Switzerland, 2001-Ill Eur. CL H.R 450.
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The right not to self-incriminate may also be protected
under national legislation, such as the UK's Civil Evidence Act
1968,14 and be further developed by case law. In the United
Kingdom, Crest Nicholson Plc v. Office of Fair Trading held:
[F]airness does not countenance a situation where someone
who reasonably believes that they are not liable for
wrongdoing can be pressured into admitting liability .. .. As
a matter of procedural fairness enforcement authorities must
not be able to compel admissions by parties so they blindly
admit guilt on the basis of a commercial decision.' 5
In the European Union, although the Court of Justice has
recognized the privilege against self-incrimination, its
jurisprudence is not fully aligned with that of the ECtHR. The
Court of Justice has so far extended protection against self-
incrimination only to answers that will result in an undertaking
or individual directly admitting the existence of an infringement,
but it does not consider that such protection applies to pre-
existing documents or to answers to factual questions.16 In the
context of an antitrust investigation, this poses significant
concerns, as many of the questions asked will be "factual"
requests for explanation.
The ECtHR, however, takes a broader view of privilege
against self-incrimination, extending it to cover pre-existing
documents in certain instances, such as where an individual
would be compelled to provide evidence of offences allegedly
committed. In addition, the ECtHR has extended the protection
to cover answers to questions that are directly and indirectly
capable of self-incrimination.17
14. Civil Evidence Act, 1968, c. 64, § 14 (Eng.).
15. Crest Nicholson Plc v. Office of Fair Trading, [2009] EWHC (Admin) 1875,
[69] (Eng.).
16. Orkem v. Commission, Case C-374/87, [1989] E.C.R. 1-3283, 1 34-35. The
Orkem decision was confirmed in Commission v. SGL Carbon AG, Case C-301/04, [2006]
E.C.R. 1-5915.
17. Funke v. France, 256 Eur. Ct. H.R. 21-22 (1993) (extending the scope of the
privilege against self-incrimination to instances in which authorities compel an applicant
to produce real evidence, such as bank statements and checkbooks); Saunders v. United
Kingdom, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2065 (noting that the privilege against self-
incrimination is not "confined to statements of admission of wrongdoing or to remarks
which are directly incriminating," but also extends to "testimony obtained under
compulsion which appears on its face to be of a non-incriminating nature-such as
exculpatory remarks or mere information on questions of fact-[which] may later be
deployed in criminal proceedings in support of the prosecution [sic] case . . . ."); J.B. v.
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Competition authorities sometimes appear to give a lower
priority to the individual's rights of defense than to their own
administrative convenience in obtaining evidence necessary for
their case. The overarching problem is frequently that individuals
are asked to provide evidence at an early stage in the process
(such as during or just after the dawn raid), at which time they
have little or no idea of the extent of the case against them and
before they have had the opportunity to obtain separate legal
advice. The practice of conducting interviews is still relatively new
in the Commission's procedure and thus its officials are not
practiced in ensuring that the questions they pose are
permissible. In practice, individuals tend to respond to questions
posed by investigators, whether or not a lawyer is present, and
without the procedural safeguards and warnings present in other
forms of investigatory interviews.
Further, national criminal investigations often start later
than related administrative investigations and such time delays
may mean that allegations are not put to individuals when they
are in a reasonable position to rebut them without the risk of
giving inconsistent answers.
Significant concerns are raised where a company provides a
competition authority with evidence that may benefit the
position of that company yet be detrimental to the position of
individual employees. Questions should be raised as to how the
authority intends to use the information that it obtains. In the
UK British Airways case, for example, information from the
immunity applicant was used by the Office of Fair Trading
("OfT") to support its failed prosecutions of British Airways
employees.'8
Companies and their lawyers must recognize and highlight
the importance of independent legal advice for relevant
individuals, although in practice, companies may wish to select,
instruct, and pay for such legal counsel for their employees.
Switzerland, 2001-111 Eur. Ct. H.R. 451 (finding a breach of Article 8 where tax
authorities compelled the applicant to submit certain documents "which would have
provided information as to his income with a view to the assessment of his taxes").
18. Press Release, Office of Fair Trading [OFT], OFT Withdraws Criminal
Proceedings against Current and Former BA Executives (May 10, 2010), available at
http://www.oft.gov.uk/news-and-updates/press/2010/47-10 (Eng.). The hearings were
at Southwark Crown Court from April 13, 2010 until May 10, 2010.
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Of interest and note is the potential new risk of damages
actions being brought by companies against their employees who
were involved in anticompetitive behavior. It remains to be seen
the extent to which such litigation will be brought, but claims
have been brought in the UK courts against the former directors
of Safeway in relation to competition infringements committed
by Safeway.19
3. Legal Privilege
Under EU law, legally privileged documents and
information cannot be reviewed or taken as part of an inspection
by the Commission. This protection is vital to ensure that
companies can obtain legal advice in complete confidence.
However, it is established EU law that advice and correspondence
from an in-house lawyer is not considered privileged. The case of
AM & S Europe Ltd. v. Commission decided that legal privilege will
only be accorded to written communications between a lawyer
and client where (1) the correspondence is sent for the purpose
of the client's rights of defense in relation to the Commission's
investigation; and (2) the correspondence is with an
independent external lawyer who is qualified to practice in a
Member State within the European Economic Area ("EEA").20
This point was recently reconfirmed by the Court of Justice in
Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd. v. Commission, which held that there is
currently no legal privilege in the European Union for in-house
lawyers and rejected arguments that the scope of such privilege
should be extended.21
Many criticisms have already been made regarding the EU's
current position on legal privilege and in-house counsel and
whether it restricts rights of access to legal representation and
the right to a fair trial (as guaranteed by Article 6 of the
ECHR).22 Although the ECtHR has not yet recognized legal
privilege for in-house lawyers, it cannot be excluded that this
19. Safeway Stores Ltd. v. Twigger, [2010] EWHC (Comm) 11, [2010] 3 All E.R
577 (Eng.).
20. AM & S Europe Ltd. v. Commission, Case C-155/79, [1982] E.C.R. 1575, 22-
27.
21. Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd. v. Commission, Case C-550/07, [2010] E.C.R.
I_, t 44-49 (delivered Sept. 14, 2010).
22. ECHR, supra note 5, art. 6.
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could happen in the future, 23 particularly given the ECtHR's view
of the ECHR as a "living instrument which must be interpreted
in the light of present-day conditions."24
B. Access to the Commission's File
1. Access to Documentary Evidence
The Commission has taken considerable steps to ensure that
it satisfies its obligations to grant parties to investigations
appropriate access to the information contained in its
investigation file. When the Statement of Objections is issued in
cartel cases, parties are provided with a CD-ROM that contains an
electronic version of the Commission's file. However, the
effectiveness of the "access to file" procedure can be
undermined by a number of factors.
Regarding the protection of confidential information,
parties are entitled to redact such information to create
nonconfidential versions of their submitted evidence, and such
nonconfidential versions are included on the CD-ROM. However,
the Commission must ensure that it applies its rules in a
standardized fashion. The levels of redaction of information
requested by some parties may be considered excessive. The
problem becomes more apparent later in the investigative
process, when the Commission is arguably more willing to accept
significant levels of redaction in the interests of finalizing the
Statement of Objections and readying the file for review. It is
hoped that the Commission considers publishing detailed
guidance, including examples, on what information can
legitimately be considered confidential in the preparation of
nonconfidential versions both of evidence for the Commission's
file and of the Commission's final decision.
23. In A.B. v. Netherlands, App. No. 37328/97, 37 Eur. H.R. Rep. 48, 949-50
(2002), the European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR") found a violation of Article 8
ECHR in regards to interference with an applicant's correspondence because prison
guards opened and screened correspondence between the applicant and the applicant's
representative during proceedings before ECHR organs. Although the ECtHR
recognized that the representative was not authorized to practice law, it extended the
scope of Article 8, noting that "neither the Convention nor the Rules of Procedure of
the European Commission of Human Rights at the material time required the
representatives of applicants to be practising lawyers." Id. at 949.
24. Socitd Colas Est v. France, 2002-111 Eur. Ct. H.R. 148.
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The Commission's Best Practices contain some guidance on
procedures that may be used to alleviate the burden of redacting
confidential information, including use of the "negotiated
disclosure procedure" and the "data room procedure," which
involve granting access to confidential information to a restricted
circle. 5 However, relatively limited information is provided
regarding these practices. If and as their use increases with time,
such guidance should be augmented by the Commission.
Furthermore, in cases conducted under the EU settlement
procedure, parties will have only limited access to the
Commission's file. Although parties will have agreed to this
procedure, it will be important to ensure that they have sufficient
access to enable them to exercise their rights of defense. For
example, the Commission has indicated that if it receives
exculpatory information in responses to the Statement of
Objections, it will transmit this information to the relevant
company, but parties are likely to desire further confirmation of
this.
2. Access to Evidence Provided Orally
In order to circumvent issues regarding disclosure of
leniency statements in court litigation (particularly in the United
States), the Commission has gone to considerable efforts to
enable parties to provide such statements orally and to prevent
the creation of discoverable documents. The transcripts of such
oral statements are not included on the CD-ROM of the
Commission's file and are made accessible only at the
Commission's offices. However, the success of this endeavor is in
itself creating various problems regarding access to the
Commission's file. In any one case, a number of parties will
typically provide evidence orally, often on a number of occasions.
It takes teams of lawyers days to either transcribe or orally record
the transcripts of statements made by leniency applicants.
The Commission could perhaps improve the process for
access to oral evidence by establishing a pro forma style to be
used by parties when making oral statements, in particular when
evidence is provided in tabular format. Further, the necessity of
fielding a team of lawyers to review the evidence on the
25. DG COMPETION, supra note 2, 84.
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Commission's premises may favor parties that have hired legal
advisors with significant teams.
C. Oral Hearing and the Role of the Hearing Officer
The two EU Hearing Officers ("HO") establish a useful
safeguard in providing procedural oversight for EU antitrust
investigations. The HOs oversee the oral hearing, but also have a
role in resolving queries during the course of the investigation in
relation to, for example, access to the Commission's file.
However, the role of the HO is predominantly reactive,
rather than proactive.26 Parties may contact the HO with
concerns regarding the administration of the case, but the HO
will rarely become involved in the management of a case absent a
specific concern. The HO's involvement certainly does not fully
address the issue of the Commission acting as prosecutor, judge,
and jury (discussed further below).
It is submitted that the oral hearing, in its current format, is
of limited use to both the parties and the Commission, and
ultimately the process as a whole. The hearing provides parties
with a useful opportunity for advocacy and a chance to highlight
its key arguments to the case team. But in reality it does little
more than that. The hearing offers no real opportunity for cross-
examination of either the immunity applicant or the
Commission's case team. There is no real debate on the merits
between the case team and the parties. In practice, the
opportunity for parties is limited to the ability to ask a few
questions in the hope of inciting a response from the case team.
A huge amount of preparation is required of the participants, in
terms of both the presentations to be made and in readiness for
any questions that Commission representatives may ask. It is
submitted that, in practice, participants obtain very little in
return, and an opportunity for scrutiny, analysis, and review is
missed.
As the oral hearing is held at an advanced stage of the case,
the Commission's case team may not be open to hearing new
26. It will be interesting to observe over the coming months whether the
appointment of Wouter Wils as a Hearing Officer (along with Michael Albers) will alter
this position. Wils has published widely on issues of competition procedure, and the fact
that he joins the Hearing Office from the Commission's Legal Service rather than from
within DG Competition may be considered to increase levels of independent scrutiny.
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arguments from the parties and arguably may have already
formed concrete views regarding the involvement of the parties.
Regarding attendees other than the case team, such attendance
cannot be guaranteed. Certainly the ultimate decision maker, the
College of Commissioners, does not attend the oral hearing.
Although their availability is inevitably limited, it would be
beneficial to ensure the presence of senior members of DG
Competition (such as the Director-General or one of his
deputies) at the hearing. Such senior officials are removed from
the day-to-day running of the investigation and attendance at the
hearing would help to guarantee a certain level of involvement
and experienced oversight. A move in this direction may create
something more akin to an actual hearing where the defendants
and prosecutors could have a real debate before a third party,
even if, for now, that third party is a senior official.
D. Clarity of Procedural Steps
Previously, in cartel cases, the fact that a Statement of
Objections had been sent to parties was confirmed by the
Commission only if specific questions were asked by the press,
and frequently only if one or more parties had publicly
confirmed receipt. However, the Commission will now publish
information regarding the opening of proceedings, which in
cartel cases is at the time of adoption of the Statement of
Objections. It appears from recent cases that the Commission will
continue its previous practice of keeping any announcement on
the subject brief and not identifying any of the entities involved.
If this practice continues, then such clarity regarding the
procedural status is to be welcomed.
However, additional questions remain regarding the extent
to which the Commission will publicize other procedural steps.
How will it deal with situations where the case against one or
more parties is dropped during the course of the investigation,
but continued against others? The Best Practices state that the
Commission will not publish this information until the final
decision.2 ' However, a party dropped from the Commission's
investigation may well wish to publicize this fact and to receive
public confirmation from the Commission, particularly if there
27. DG COMPETITION, supra note 2, 1 70.
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has been any public speculation regarding its involvement or any
impact on its share price.
II. THE DEFENDANT'S VIEW FROM THREE THOUSAND FEET
Taking a step back from the specific detail of the raid and
the subsequent investigatory procedure, a number of further
aspects raise concern, including key elements such as the
operation of the Commission's leniency program and the level of
sanction imposed.
A. Leniency
The benefits to companies of applying to the Commission
for leniency from fines are huge. A company in receipt of full
immunity can break the law, profit from such illegal activity,
cause harm to customers, competitors, and the wider market,
and then not be fined for such behavior. To operate such a
system was a significant policy decision by the Commission, but it
is a model that works and one that is used by antitrust regimes
worldwide. Despite the huge benefits, it cannot be denied that
the risks for companies are significant, due to their "admission"
of participation in illegal activity and the (albeit limited)
possibility of having conditional leniency revoked.
It has been argued that there are three cornerstones of an
effective leniency program: (1) severe sanctions; (2) perceived
high risk of detection; and (3) transparency and predictability to
the greatest extent possible.28 The EU system certainly
incorporates the first two elements, but further steps are
necessary before it can lay claim to the third. The Commission
has taken significant steps, in particular in the revised 2006
version of its Leniency Notice,29 to clarify its procedures further,
but certain elements remain opaque and could benefit from
additional predictability. For example, the Commission might
consider providing additional guidance on the provision of oral
evidence, including the desired format, or further concrete
28. See INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK [ICN], ANTI-CARTEL
ENFORCEMENT MANUAL ch. 2 (2009), available at http://www.international
competitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc341.pdf.
29. Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines and Reduction of Fines in Cartel
Cases, 2006 O.J. C 298/17.
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examples of evidence that would constitute "significant added
value" or cooperation "outside the scope of the Leniency
Notice." The recently published Best Practices specifically
exclude both the leniency and settlement regimes from their
ambit, and it is submitted that this was a missed opportunity to
provide important clarification.
Of most use to practitioners, and therefore to companies,
would be written guidance that relates only to cartels, collating
the useful information that is currently spread between guidance
on, for example, leniency, settlements, access to file, and
inspections. Procedures in areas such as the provision of oral
evidence or access to the Commission's evidential file often
change rapidly, and practitioners and companies alike should be
kept informed of such developments. Although nothing can
replace the knowledge acquired by practitioners through
involvement in cartel cases and observing the Commission's
practice firsthand, there remains a need for such procedure to be
codified to a certain extent to ensure access for all companies
and advisors. The Commission has itself admitted that part of the
reason for publishing the Best Practices was the differing
procedures between units in DG Competition. Given that the
cartel units are concentrated within one directorate, their
practice presumably remains relatively homogenous, but the
improvement of written guidance could only serve to increase
levels of consistency. Furthermore, it appears that such guidance
exists within DG Competition in the form of an internal
handbook providing significant detail on the procedures to be
followed in instances including the inadvertent disclosure of
confidential information and the conduct of dawn raids.30 While
certain elements have undoubtedly been incorporated into the
Best Practices, the majority of such internal guidance has not
been rendered transparent.
30. See Lewis Crofts, EC Under Pressure to Disclose Inner Workings of Antitrust
Procedures, MLEX (Feb. 22, 2010), http://www.mlex.com/content.aspx?ID=90393&
print=true; Lewis Crofts, EC Brands Access Request to Internal Antitrust Book "Premature";
Ombudsman Disagrees, MLEx (June 22, 2010), http://www.mlex.com/content.aspx?ID=
103680&print=true.
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1. Absence of a "One-Stop-Shop" for Leniency
The ongoing problem of the absence of a "one-stop-shop"
for leniency applications has been well documented. The
problem will not be considered here in detail, but it remains of
concern. Currently, cases may be dealt with by a number of
authorities and, although leniency programs worldwide are
becoming increasingly standardized, differences in EU national
systems remain. For example, immunity for a cartel ringleader is
not available in Germany, and a successful leniency application
in the UK protects employees from criminal investigation
whereas it does not in France.
The absence of a united system for leniency applications
may lead to a problem regarding the use of "markers" to secure a
place in the leniency queue. For example, if a party puts down a
marker for leniency in a national case, this may become
irrelevant if the Commission then takes over the case and refuses
to honor such a marker. In Germany, for example, a marker is
available for leniency applications, while in the European Union
it is only available for immunity applicants.
Companies would undoubtedly prefer to see a "one-stop-
shop" for leniency within the European Union as mooted by
previous Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes.3' However,
standardization has been much improved through initiatives
such as the European Competition Network's ("ECN") model
leniency program, which includes the use of summary leniency
applications,32 and the International Competition Network's
("ICN") Anti-Cartel Enforcement Manual,33 and it is hoped that
such harmonization will continue.
2. Concept of "Significant Added Value"
In the European Union, the concept of the "significant
added value" contributed by a party's evidence is key, but it can
31. See Commission Press Release, SPEECH/05/205 (Apr. 7, 2005); Commission
Press Release, SPEECH/06/494 (Sept. 15, 2006).
32. EUROPEAN COMPETITION NETWORK [ECN], ECN MODEL LENIENCY PROGRAMME
1 2 (Oct. 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/modelleniency
en.pdf; ECN, LIST OF AUTHORITIES ACCEPTING SUMMARY APPLICATIONS AS PROVIDED BY
THE ECN MODEL LENIENCY PROGRAMME IN TYPE 1A CASES (2010), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/list-of authorities.pdf.
33. ICN, supra note 28.
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be difficult for parties to assess exactly what will be required in
order to meet this standard. What evidence constitutes
"significant added value" remains extremely case specific. In the
EU Gas Insulated Switchgear case,34 for example, only the
immunity applicant received a reduction in fine, even though
leniency applications were made only six days after the dawn raid
took place. The Commission considered that none of the
evidence provided by the other parties contributed "significant
added value" to the evidence already in its possession. 35 Although
this is within the letter of the Leniency Notice, the Commission's
previous practice made this most unexpected.
The Commission has ceased to hand out fine reductions as
easily as it did previously under an earlier version of the Leniency
Notice, when simply not contesting the facts as set out in the
Statement of Objections often led to a ten percent reduction in
fine.36 But companies do still expect that being one of the first
companies to apply for leniency, and bringing in a significant
amount of relevant contemporary evidence, will lead to a certain
level of reduction. A significant change in this expectation may
lead companies to query the wisdom of spending large amounts
of time and money on reviewing documents and preparing a
leniency application. For companies, applying for leniency is by
no means an automatic decision, but a risk-balancing exercise. A
leniency application is an admission of guilt, but there is no
automatic reduction in fine if evidence provided is not
considered to provide added value. Further, as there is no official
"marker" system available for leniency (as opposed to immunity)
applications, an applicant may find itself bypassed by newer
applications in the queue for leniency.
Although a certain level of guidance has been given, both in
the Commission's Leniency Notice and through cases in the EU
courts, it would be most useful if agencies could provide more
evidence on what they are looking for as the case progresses. The
same concerns apply to the issue of "continuous cooperation,"
34. Commission Decision No. COMP/F/38899 (Gas Insulated Switchgear), 2008 O.J.
C 5/7.
35. Id.
36. See Commission Notice on the Non-Imposition or Reduction of Fines in Cartel
Cases, 1996 O.J. C 207/04.
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where the requirements can vary from case to case and case team
to case team.
As a further general comment, it may be argued that the
balance has gone too far in protecting the recipient of
conditional immunity and that too little is left available to
companies that are not "first in" to the Commission. It is
accepted that the immunity applicant receives no fine and that its
employees are frequently protected from criminal liability.
However, various legislative initiatives have suggested according
further protection to the immunity applicant. The Commission's
White Paper on damages actions suggested that protection from
damages actions might be given,37 although in reality this may be
achieved already to a certain extent through agreements between
the immunity applicant and class-actions firms whereby the
immunity applicant provides the claimant with evidence in
return for being excluded from the scope of the damages action.
The OFT has also previously suggested that there should be no
joint and several liability for immunity recipients.38 In the United
States, damages are de-trebled and there is no several liability for
qualifying immunity applicants. Although the burden on
immunity applicants is considerable, particularly given the
ongoing requirement of complete cooperation, care needs to be
taken to ensure that the balance does not tip too far in favor of
their protection.
B. Level of Fines
Over recent years, levels of Commission fines have risen to
heights that few would hesitate to consider astronomical. In 2008,
fines totaling C1.38 billion were imposed on companies involved
in a car-glass cartel.39 This was the largest fine in the history of
antitrust enforcement worldwide and included an C896 million
fine for Saint Gobain-at the time the highest fine ever imposed
on one company for cartel infringement. Although fines in other
37. Commission of the European Communities, White Paper on Damages Actions
for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM (2008) 165 Final (Apr. 2008) [hereinafter
White Paper].
38. OFT, DISCUssIoN PAPER, PRIvATE AcnONS IN COMPETITION LAw: EFFEcTIVE
REDRESS FOR CONSUMERS AND BUSINESS 117.17-.18 (Apr. 2007).
39. Commission Decision Summary No. COMP/39125 (Car Glass), 2009 O.J. C
173/13.
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cases have not quite reached these levels, they remain high. In
2009, for example, a C553 million fine was imposed on each of
two companies involved in a cartel in the gas sector.40
Of course, the Commission has made a policy decision to
pursue high-profile cases and those that have a significant impact
on consumers. Not all complaints or leniency applications result
in Commission investigations, and not all investigations result in
headline-grabbing fines. However, the fact remains that the
overall level of fines has risen and is likely to continue to rise.
Certainly the EU Commissioners for Competition appear to have
no concerns that their fines might be too high. In November
2009, former Commissioner Kroes said, "I have no time for
arguments that our fines are too high. Tell that to the businesses
and consumers who still suffer at the hands of cartels." 41
Commissioner Almunia stated, "The best recommendation I can
give to companies is not to [engage] in anti-competitive practices
so that they will not have to care about the fines"4 2 and later
added, "I have complete confidence in our current system." 43
Until now, such views appear to have been supported by the
EU courts, which have repeatedly confirmed the Commission's
significant level of discretion in setting its fines.44 Although fines
are relatively frequently amended on appeal, they have not been
reduced by the EU courts simply for being too high. However,
there have recently been signs that the judges of the General
Court consider that they cannot continue to ignore the ongoing
debate regarding the level of Commission fines for antitrust
infringements. Judge Nicholas Forwood of the General Court
recently commented that " [c] ourts tend to be respectful, they try
not to second-guess the regulator. [But] the reality is, . . . many
competition cases are now presenting a quasi-penal character." 45
40. Commission Decision Summary No. COMP/39401 (E. ON/GDF Collusion), 2009
O.J. C 248/05.
41. Commission Press Release, SPEECH/09/521 (Nov. 11, 2009).
42. Emily Gray, DG Comp's New Helmsman, GLOBAL COMPETITION REV., Mar. 2010,
at 6.
43. Commission Press Release, SPEECH/10/233 (May 12, 2010) [hereinafter
Almunia Competition Day Speech].
44. See, e.g., Dansk Rorindustri A/S v. Commission, Joined Cases C-189, 202, 205-
08, 213/02 P, [2005] E.C.R. 1-5425.
45. Ana Rita Rego, EUJudge Forwood Says Court 'Conscious' Cartel Case-Law Review
May Be Due, MLEX (June 11, 2010), http://www.mlex.com/.aspx?ID=102322&print=true
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The comments by Judge Forwood fuel the argument that
EU cartel fines have become "criminal charges" in nature under
the ECtHR "Engel Criteria."46 Hypothetically applying the Engel
Criteria, practitioners and academics argue that the ECtHR
would conclude that cartel fines constitute criminal charges and
that alleged cartelists therefore fall under the ambit of Article 6
ECHR. For instance, Wouter Wils, previously a member of the
Commission's Legal Service and now a Hearing Officer, has
stated, "That the application of these 'Engel criteria' to the
European Commission's antitrust fining procedures leads to the
conclusion that these procedures are 'criminal' within the
autonomous meaning of Article 6 ECHR, is no longer news." 47
In terms of the legal classification of cartel infringements,
the ECtHR has stated on numerous occasions that the domestic
classification of an offence is "not decisive." 48 Therefore, the fact
that Article 23(5) of Regulation 1/2003 states that a Commission
decision to fine an undertaking "shall not be of a criminal law
nature" will not be decisive.
Once a fine is determined to be criminal, the full range of
the Article 6 ECHR rights are available to defendants. These are
commonly referred to collectively as the "rights of defense" or
the "right to a fair trial" and include the right to (1) have a fair
and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal;
(2) have publicly announced judgments; (3) be presumed
innocent until proved guilty; (4) be informed promptly of the
nature and cause of the accusation against oneself; (5) be given
adequate time and facilities for the preparation of one's defense;
(6) defend oneself in person or through legal assistance of one's
own choosing; and (7) examine or have examined witnesses
against oneself.
(quoting comments made at the Friends of Europe roundtable event, New Transatlantic
Trends in Competition Policy, on June 10, 2010).
46. The "Engel Criteria" look at the (1) legal classification of the offense in
domestic law; (2) nature of the offense; and (3) nature and degree of severity of the
possible penalty. See, e.g., Janosevic v. Sweden, 2002-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 26 (applying the
Engel Criteria to determine whether tax surcharges were criminal in nature).
47. Wouter P.J. Wils, The Increased Level of EU Antitrust Fines, judicial Review, and the
European Convention on Human Rights, 33 WORLD COMPETITION LAw & ECON. REV. 5, 13
(2010) (citing EU courts' case law that has recognized the criminal nature of the
Commission's competition fines).
48. Paykar Yev Haghtanak Ltd. v. Armenia, App. No. 21638/03 (2007), available at
http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2007/1130.html.
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In relation to EU cartel proceedings, the criticism has been
raised that the right to a hearing by an independent and
impartial tribunal is breached, given the breadth of the
Commission's role. However, the ECtHR appears to have created
an exception to this right, as administrative proceedings are
allowed to result in certain fines (such as tax surcharges) "even if
they come to large amounts" as long as the administrative
decision can be appealed before a judicial body that has "full
jurisdiction, including the power to quash in all respects, on
questions of fact and law, the challenged decision."49 However, it
has to be questioned whether, even if EU cartel fines were to fall
into this exception, the right of appeal to the General Court in
practice satisfies the requirement of a "full jurisdictional" review,
given the Commission's level of discretion in setting fines.
Moreover, the ECtHR itself said in the Jussila case that
"competition law" cases are part of the "gradual broadening of
the criminal head [of Article 6] to cases not strictly belonging to
the traditional categories of the criminal law."50
C. Parental and Successor Liability
The issue of parent or successor liability appears to be raised
in the majority of cartel cases and it remains an issue of real
uncertainty for parties. The Commission has repeatedly
confirmed that there is a rebuttable presumption that a parent
company has "decisive influence" over its fully owned
subsidiary.5' This position has been strongly criticized for a
number of reasons. The rebuttable presumption is, in practice,
very difficult to rebut, as companies essentially have to prove a
negative. This, and the fact that there is no requirement for the
parent company to have acted intentionally or negligently, means
that the rebuttable presumption looks more like strict liability.
Given that Article 23(2) of Regulation 1/2003 requires that, for
fines to be imposed, undertakings must have intentionally or
negligently infringed Article 101 (or Article 102),52 it can be
49. Janosevic, 2002-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 31.
50. Jussila v. Finland, 45 Eur. H.R. Rep. 39, 902-03 (2006).
51. See, e.g., Akzo Nobel v. Commission, Case C-97/08 P, [2009] E.C.R. 1-8237, 1 60.
52. Council Regulation 1/2003 on the Implementation of the Rules on
Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2003 O.J. L 1/1.
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argued that an entirely "innocent" parent company should not
be fined.
Imposing a fine on a parent company inevitably enables the
Commission to impose higher fines, as the turnover of the parent
company is larger than that of its subsidiary, leading to criticism
that the Commission is using this as a vehicle for increasing
fining totals.
However, although the Commission's position appears clear,
there is in practice considerable inconsistency regarding when
the Commission will consider a parent company liable. In a
single cartel decision with a number of separate addressees, some
parent companies may be held liable while others are not.
Practitioners and companies alike have called for the
Commission to clarify its position in this area. Although the
Commission has publicly indicated that, where it can, it will
impose a fine on a parent company, this view is not codified.
In order to clarify the position, the Commission would do
well to confirm methods by which a parent company might be
able to rebut the presumption of "decisive influence." Further,
the Commission needs to clarify when and how leniency
applications may be extended to cover parent and successor
companies.53 Given that the number of mergers and acquisitions
is set to rise, and that corporate structures are becoming ever-
more complicated, the Commission should not hesitate to clarify
its views.
Regarding successor liability, the Commission tends to
impose fines jointly and severally on entities that may no longer
be related but must then divide attribution, causing problems. In
practice the fine often ends up being paid by the new owner,
although of course companies may have used warranties and
other contractual terms to protect their position. Where possible,
the Commission should separate out the different financial
liabilities as far as it is able.
53. A further issue requiring clarification is that of whether and how leniency
applications can be extended to cover joint ventures to which the leniency applicant is
party.
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D. Settlements
After a very slow start, the EU settlement procedure is
starting to be used and its benefits are becoming clearer. At its
inception, the ten percent reduction in fines was roundly
criticized as being too low and an insufficient incentive for
parties. However, it appears that participants have found a
significant benefit, not so much in the reduction in fine, but in
the ability to have a dialogue with the Commission during the
case and to discuss (and arguably to influence) the scope of the
case. Despite the Commission's protestations that there is no
plea-bargaining in the European Union, participants appear to
feel that a benefit is derived from taking part in the settlement
process.
When introducing the settlement regime, the Commission
indicated that it did not expect to apply the settlement process in
relation to "hybrid" cases (i.e., cases in which not all parties want
to use the process). This caused commentators to raise
understandable questions about what would happen if not all
parties agreed or if a party changed its mind. However, it seems
that the Commission has altered its view, as its second settlement
case was a hybrid case in which all but one party settled.5 4
However, the Commission's comments at its press briefing on the
day the fine was issued appeared to criticize the party that did not
proceed with the settlement procedure, saying that the company
would have to explain to its shareholders why its fine was higher
because it did not cooperate. If the settlement procedure is truly
voluntary then parties should not be criticized for choosing not
to take part.
The Commission has also made clear that settlement will not
be used in cases where there are any questions about liability. In
practical terms, this rules out many cases and almost all cases in
which the infringing entity has subsequently been sold. This is of
particular relevance as cartels are often exposed, at the time of a
change in company ownership, to thorough legal and
commercial due diligence. However, it remains to be seen
whether the Commission is wedded to this view or whether, as
with its approach to hybrid cases, its position will alter with time.
54. Commission Decision No. COMP/38866 (Animal Feed Phosphates), slip op. (July
20, 2010); Commission Press Release, IP/10/985 (July 20, 2010).
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A continuing area of interest is the overlap between the
settlement and the leniency programs. The Commission has
indicated that the two systems are cumulative and that
settlements should not detract from leniency. However, it
appears that the Commission presumes the settlement procedure
will be exploited mainly by companies that have already applied
for leniency. The window for leniency applications closes along
with the window for raising interest in exploring settlement. This
puts pressure on companies to prepare a leniency application in
a very short period, even if they are not interested in settlement.
Companies likely would prefer a single system incorporating all
elements of leniency, settlements, and fines.
The full interaction between the settlement process and
actions for damages remains to be seen. However, the general
position is that settled cases will be shorter and not lead to
appeals.55 These may therefore lead to earlier exposure to claims
for the parties involved. Conversely, the shorter "settled"
decision will provide less evidence for third parties to use in
damages actions.
E. Timing and Delay
The current length of time that the Commission takes to
reach a decision in a cartel case is so significant as to be unfair-
both to defendants and to potential plaintiffs (as discussed
further below). Even under the settlement procedure, the
Commission is only aiming to reach a final decision within two
years.
During the period before a final decision is reached,
companies must continue to make provision for a possible fine,
pay legal advisors, commit company time and resources, and
disclose the ongoing investigation to shareholders, insurers, and
auditors. Of course, certain companies prefer the wait before the
final decision to be as long as possible, so that the fine does not
have to be paid immediately, but many would prefer to finalize
the case. The Commission appears aware that it needs to reduce
55. Parties to the first settled case, Commission Decision No. COMP/38511
(DRAM) (May 19, 2010), have indicated that they will not appeal, but the non-settling
party in the Commission's second settled case, Animal Feed Phosphates, has appealed. See
Timab Industries v. Commission, Case T-456/10 (pending case).
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the time it takes to reach a final decision, but the Commission
must ensure that it takes practical steps to achieve this.
Further, the delay in publishing a public nonconfidential
version of the final decision (an issue discussed further below)
creates an uneven playing field both for companies and for their
legal advisors. Certain elements of the Commission's procedural
and decisional practice will alter over time and, absent
publication of the decisions, only those involved in the relevant
cases will have that information. In relation to the leniency
program, for example, significant procedural developments,
including the ability to provide corporate statements orally and
thereby reduce the risk of disclosure in the US courts, only
became widely communicated when the Commission published a
revised version of its Leniency Notice in 2006. Disseminating the
information more swiftly can only serve to better inform both
companies and legal advisors and ensure that future cases can
proceed more efficiently. The Commission must help to ensure
that companies are able quickly and effectively to obtain
information and advice that enables them to assess their position.
F. Transfer of Information between Competition Authorities
Given the effort that companies make to ensure that the
evidence they provide is not able to be disclosed in other
jurisdictions," it is not surprising that the issue of transfer of
information between competition authorities raises such
concerns for parties. A certain level of comfort and clarification
regarding transfer of information between authorities in the
ECN is provided to parties through the guidance set out in the
Commission Notice on Cooperation within the Network of
Competition Authorities.57 However, information may also be
exchanged on a bilateral basis with countries outside the ECN,
and the scope for exchanging information (formally and
informally) is getting wider as more countries develop
competition regimes, engage in information agreements, and
join organizations such as the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development and the ICN.
56. See supra Part I.B.2 (regarding access to orally provided evidence).
57. Commission Notice on Cooperation within the Network of Competition
Authorities, 2004 O.J. C 101/43 (Competition Authorities Cooperation).
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Even if information requests are made to the parties, and
not between agencies, they may be based on previous requests
made by other competition authorities and may therefore be
disproportionately broad. For example, certain significant
jurisdictions tend to request all documents that have been
produced to other agencies. Companies may be loath to spend
significant time and effort satisfying such requests in jurisdictions
where their exposure is limited and where such efforts therefore
appear disproportionate.
III. THE DEFENDANT'S VIEW FROM THIRTY THOUSAND FEET
A. The Commission asJudge, Jury, Legislator, and Prosecutor
Commissioner Almunia has indicated that he believes the
EU's "administrative system compares positively and favourably
with many other systems. Indeed, when the Commission decides
to act, this decision is not only extensively reasoned and subject
to the Courts' judicial review, it also comes after a process that
fully involves the companies concerned."58 It is true that the
current system incorporates a number of checks and balances
that seek to ensure the impartiality and justifiability of the
Commission's decisions. Such safeguards include (1) the receipt
of a fully detailed Statement of Objections and the opportunity
to reply in writing; (2) access to the Commission's file; (3)
oversight by the Hearing Officer; (4) use of peer review panels;
(5) input from members of the Chief Economist team and the
Legal Service; (6) review by national competition authorities
sitting in the Advisory Committee and by other directorates
within the Commission; and (7) approval by the full College of
Commissioners.
However, the Commission continues to be criticized for its
overarching role as judge, jury, legislator, and prosecutor.59 The
absence of a separation of powers does seem, on the most basic
level, to be inconsistent with the rule of law and due process.
Furthermore, the arbiters of the final decision, the
58. Commission Press Release, SPEECH/10/81 (Mar. 9, 2010) [hereinafter
Almunia Antitrust Speech].
59. Indeed, the Commission may now have a further occasional role as damages
complainant. It is currently pursuing a follow-on damages action in the Brussels
commercial court in relation to the lifts and escalators cartel.
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Commissioners, are political appointees. According to
Commissioner Almunia, they "have sworn to be and are
genuinely independent of national, political and business
interests."60 However, concerns will always be raised that
decisions imposing fines of such magnitude are imposed by a
group of fixed-term political appointees.
Criticism of the Commission's broad role is becoming
increasingly public. For example, during the investigation that
led the Commission to fine Intel C1.06 billion for abuse of a
dominant position, Intel made a complaint to the European
Ombudsman in which it argued:
[I]n competition cases, the Commission acts as "the
investigator, the jury and the judge" and is subject to judicial
review only after it has adopted a decision. In particular, and
in contrast to the system in place in some Member States,
such as France, where the investigatory and adjudicative
functions are split between two agencies, the Commission
has the power both to conduct an investigation of the facts
and to adopt a decision establishing that an infringement of
the competition rules has occurred. In the complainant's
view, the extensive nature of the Commission's powers
requires that the Commission exercise particular vigilance
against any tendency toward bias, lack of objectivity or
overzealous prosecution, when performing its investigative
and adjudicative functions.61
There are of course many other examples in the European
Union and around the world of enforcement systems that seek to
have separate prosecutorial and sanctioning functions. At one
end of the scale are systems such as those in Sweden and the
United States, where the agency prosecutes and a court
adjudicates, and if the court finds a company guilty, it
administers a decision and penalty. Closer to the Commission
model, in various EU Member States there are examples of
unitary enforcement agencies that maintain a formal or informal
separation of powers between investigators and decision makers,
such as those in Belgium, France, and Spain.
60. SeeAlmunia Antitrust Speech, supra note 58.
61. European Ombudsman Decision, Complaint No. 1935/2008/FOR, 1 46 (July
14, 2009) (closing his inquiry into complaint 1935/2008/FOR against the European
Commission).
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There are a number of steps that could be taken toward
allaying concerns about due process. One potential solution
might be for the Commission to have a purely investigative role
and for the decision and fine to be imposed by the General
Court. This, after all, is a model used in a number of countries,
although there are of course a number of arguments against it.
One such argument would be the length of time it would take to
receive a final decision, given the need to involve the courts.
However, given that almost every cartel decision is currently
appealed, the time taken to reach a decision that is less likely to
be appealed may be time well spent. Expertise within the General
Court could be concentrated within a separate chamber, or even
a separate court, dealing with competition cases, and possibly a
fast-track procedure could be instituted. A further concern is that
such a solution would require serious institutional reform. A less
radical solution would be to follow a form of the French model
and internally separate the prosecutors from a panel of internal
arbiters (such as senior officials), who would then choose
whether to prosecute and then present a decision for the
Commissioners to adopt or reject. While this model does not
completely separate out prosecution and judges into different
institutions, it does provide a form of independence of the two
functions.
B. The Impact of the Possibility of Criminal Sanctions and Extradition
Although criminal sanctions are not available at the EU
level, the Commission must ensure that it acknowledges that its
administrative sanctions now operate in the wider context of
criminal penalties. It cannot afford to have a blanket view that
the two are in no way interrelated. The potential risks for
individuals have become much greater, especially given the
possibility of being extradited to countries such as the United
States to stand trial, and this must impact the Commission's
decisional procedure. For example, as discussed above, care must
be taken to ensure that the position of individuals is protected
and that the privilege against self-incrimination is respected.
However, despite the clear need to ensure that the position
of individuals is respected and protected, perhaps consideration
should be given to introducing individual administrative liability
in the European Union. There is an argument to be made that
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anticompetitive behavior is, in many cases, the action of specific
individuals and that, although corporate responsibility should
not be lessened, significant deterrence needs to be targeted at
individuals. Of course, there will be cases where anticompetitive
behavior is rife within a company, and the ethos of the company
condones this. However, in many cases, the infringement stems
from a handful (or fewer) of employees acting in clear
contradiction of internal company compliance rules. It is
submitted that there could be a role for individual sanctions in
cases where the actions are those of a rogue employee, as
opposed to those cases where anticompetitive behavior is
endemic and encouraged.
C. The Impact of Human Rights Arguments
As highlighted throughout this discussion, the European
Union's forthcoming accession to the ECHR and the binding
nature of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights are likely to
alter the antitrust landscape in the EU. It will be possible for
companies eventually to challenge Commission procedure at the
ECtHR level, adding an additional layer of judicial recourse and
a measure of influence and restraint on DG Competition. Even
absent such recourse, the increase in awareness among the EU
judiciary, legal advisors, and companies themselves will likely
mean that issues of human rights are more frequently raised and,
above all, better protected.
D. The Impact of the Increase in Damages Actions
DG Competition has always maintained that an increase in
the number of damages actions will not alter the EU's position
toward public anti-cartel enforcement. It considers that the
public and private enforcement regimes pursue different policies
and priorities, and that the deterrence goals of significant fines
do not overlap with the compensatory goals of damages actions.
The Commission would therefore not expect to alter its fining
policy to reflect an increase in the number of damages actions.
However, if the number of damages actions significantly
increases, the Commission may need to review its current
position. As suggested below, there may be possibilities for
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interaction between the two regimes that could usefully be
explored.
E. A TimeforChange?
The issues raised above, particularly that of the
Commission's role as judge, jury, legislator, and prosecutor,
suggest that the Commission faces a number of questions
regarding its current system. The question must be asked
whether the Commission will itself instigate internal reform or
whether criticism of the current system will increase to a point
where such reform is imposed upon it. Currently, no reform
appears to be in the offing, and Commissioner Almunia has
stated clearly that he has no intention of substantially rethinking
the current system: " [T] he merits of our system as such should
not be put into question. We will not follow those who ask us
radical changes in this field."62 It therefore appears that critics of
the current system will have to play the long game,
demonstrating the need for certain limited procedural changes
in the short term in the hope that this will lead to more
significant developments in the long term. Reform appears
probable, with the ECtHR likely leading the way, but it seems that
it should not be expected during the five years of Commissioner
Almunia's mandate.
IV. THE VIEW FROM THE OTHER SIDE: DAMAGES
CLAIMANTS
Whatever the level of fines and whatever the financial
hardship caused to the infringing companies, Commission fines
paid go to the public purse and do nothing to compensate
parties harmed by the anticompetitive activity. The Commission
has therefore spent several years studying the issue of private
actions for antitrust damages and has taken significant steps to
craft legislation to encourage such actions. However, recent focus
seems to have been on reaching agreement between the EU
institutions and between the EU Member States, and this has
stalled the Commission's efforts. The focus must also remain on
potential claimants; if a damages policy is not sufficiently
62. Commission Press Release, SPEECH/10/305, at 4 (June 10, 2010).
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attractive to them and does not remove unmerited procedural
shields for defendants, then it will have very limited success.
In the authors' experience, most companies that are
harmed, typically by supplier cartels, do not want to go to court.
They want to settle out of court as quickly as possible, recover
their damages, try to salvage the relationship with their supplier,
and continue their business. This is clearly the most efficient and
fair outcome in cases where a competition agency has found
against a cartel and the facts and liability are not in dispute.
However, the procedural obstacles discussed below often
dissuade parties with strong claims from bringing cases. The lack
of a credible threat of effective and immediate court action
unnecessarily deters potential plaintiffs while emboldening
cartelists to stall and not settle even in the face of an agency
decision against them. Fixing these obstacles is vital to increasing
the number of private actions undertaken in Europe. In short,
better and fairer procedures are the key to encouraging plaintiffs
to seek justice in this area. Former Commissioner Kroes put it
well: "Out-of-court settlements can only really work if they are
coupled with a realistic chance of effective court action."63
A. Obstacles to Effective Damages Actions and Possible Fixes
A number of issues that continue to hamper the increase in
damages actions are discussed below. There are, however, further
barriers that are not considered here, including those of funding
such actions and the structure and authorization of class actions.
1. Absence of EU-Wide Legislation
The absence of EU-wide legislation in relation to damages
actions has been well documented. The Commission has been
keen to pursue development in this area, publishing a White
Paper in April 2008 on the issue of damages actions for breach of
the EC antitrust rules and proceeding with the preparation of a
draft directive.
Commissioner Kroes had hoped to produce legislation in
this area before the end of her mandate, but such legislation
stalled due to a number of factors, including objections from a
number of members of the European Parliament. Although a
63. Commission Press Release, SPEECH/07/698, at 4 (Nov. 9, 2007).
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draft directive was in advanced form a year ago," it will certainly
not re-emerge until a number of issues have been resolved. The
main concerns have revolved around issues of collective redress,
and the Commission has agreed that, "[b]efore taking any
action, [it] first must agree on common principles that can be
applied in various areas, beyond competition."65 The
Commission plans to hold a public consultation in 2011 and,
following this, "will take a position on this general framework,
which will form the basis of individual legislative proposals, such
as the one on antitrust damages actions." 66
The Commission also intends to explore the options for
making use of alternative dispute resolution ("ADR").
Commissioner Dalli (responsible for health and consumer
policy) has indicated that he views this as "a key factor for any
redress system, and not solely in the context of collective
redress."67 Arbitration and mediation may well be attractive to
corporate claimants, given that they are likely to be swifter and
less expensive than a court case and have far fewer rules of
evidence and discovery. It will be interesting to observe whether
DG Competition will advocate the use of ADR systems in relation
to antitrust cases.
2. The Availability of the Passing-On Defense
The issue of passing-on, and the availability of a passing-on
defense, is key to the success of an efficient damages actions
regime. It is submitted that direct purchasers are currently the
key players in civil suits and that a focus needs to be placed on
incentivizing such potential plaintiffs by putting them in a strong
position procedurally.
A focus on the passing-on defense could make it difficult for
full compensation (which has clearly been the goal in the
European Union) to be achieved. In general terms, the damage
suffered by an indirect purchaser is limited, and such a purchaser
64. This draft was widely leaked and informal comments were provided to DG
Competition from a number of quarters.
65. Commission Press Release, SPEECH/10/35 (June 10, 2010).
66. See Almunia Competition Day Speech, supra note 43, at 6.
67. John Dalli, Member of the European Commission, Responsible for Health and
Consumer Policy, Address to the European Parliament's IMCO Committee (Apr. 28,
2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/dalli/docs/ep-imco-
committee-28042010_en.pdf.
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therefore has a proportionately limited incentive to commence
litigation. Direct purchasers are currently best placed to bring
damages claims in the EU, given that they tend to have more
resources and better access to evidence. Furthermore, they are
more likely to be able to use the existence of an infringement
decision as leverage in any ongoing commercial relationship.
If the passing-on defense is allowed, situations may arise in
which both indirect and direct purchasers make a claim, leading
to multiple liability and a "race for damages." Where the product
is an input (as most cartelized products are) rather than an end
product, the situation will only become more complicated.
Certain jurisdictions have already focused on this issue and,
in the case of Germany, have tried to strengthen the position of
direct purchasers by restricting the availability of the passing-on
defense. German antitrust legislation clarifies that damage to a
direct purchaser is not automatically excluded due to the resale
of the relevant goods,68 but leaves it to the courts to decide on a
case-by-case basis whether the passing-on defense can be invoked.
Recent German case law appears to indicate that judges are
unwilling to accept the defense easily, stating that "[a]pproving
the passing-on defence would be wrong merely on the basis of
the requirement emphasised by the [Court of Justice] for the
effective enforcement of [EU] law."69 If other courts in EU
Member States, and the Commission itself, were also to endorse
such a view, it would significantly facilitate the position of direct
purchasers and, it is submitted, enable the number of damages
actions brought to increase and the EU damages policy to gain
some much needed traction.
3. Discovery Issues
In terms of enabling plaintiffs to bring cases that have a
reasonable chance of success, discovery of documents is key.
Plaintiffs need to have access to evidence, otherwise they cannot
bring cases. The current rules do not facilitate plaintiffs in
68. Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrinkungen [GWB] [Act against Restraints of
Competition], July 1, 2005, BGBL. I at 2114, last amended by Gesetz, Nov. 4, 2010,
BGBL. I at 1480, § 33(3) (Ger.) ("If a good or service is purchased at an excessive price,
a damage shall not be excluded on account of the resale of the good or service.").
69. Oberlandesgerichte Karlsruhe [Higher Regional Court of Karlsruhe] June 11,
2010, 6 U 118/05 (Kart.), 2010 (Ger.) (authors' translation).
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obtaining documents from third parties and defendants, and
consequently they are more likely to try to obtain agency
documents. The Commission is clear that the effectiveness of the
leniency program must be protected, and specifically that
corporate statements should be protected from disclosure:
Given the inevitable interaction between an increased level
of damages claims and the operation of an efficient leniency
programme, it appears appropriate to maintain the
attractiveness of leniency programmes in Europe, on the one
hand, by ensuring an adequate level of protection of
leniency applications in a future context of an enhanced
level of actions for damages, and, on the other hand, to
further reflect on the possibility to further incentivise
potential immunity applicants. 70
The Commission has defended this position in practice,
appearing as amicus curiae in US courts to avoid disclosure of
leniency applications7' and refusing requests to grant access to
documents from its files.72
Although the Commission has taken significant steps to
ensure that corporate statements are protected from discovery,73
such statements are often heavily relied on in EU Statements of
Objection (not necessarily with attribution), which are regularly
included in US discovery requests and sometimes granted. A
company that had not applied for leniency might therefore be in
a better position, as less directly attributable information would
be contained in the Statement of Objections.
70. Commission of the European Communities, Commission Staff Working Paper
Accompanying the White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust
Rules, COM (2008) 165 Final, 1 286 (Apr. 2008) [hereinafter Commission Staff
Working Paper].
71. See, e.g., In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, No. 99-197, 2002 WL 34499542, at
*6 (D.D.C. Dec. 18, 2002) (holding that leniency statements were discoverable); Order
on Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Production of Documents Submitted to Governmental
Authorities, In re Methionine Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 00-1311 CRB (JCS) (N.D.
Cal. 2001) (holding that leniency statements were not discoverable) (on file with the
Fordham International Law Journal). It should be noted that this was prior to the
possibility of making oral leniency statements in the European Union and therefore
substantially circumventing US disclosure issues.
72. See EnBW Energie Baden-Wairttenberg v. Commission, Case T-344/08 (pending
case); CDC Hydrogen Peroxide v. Commission, Case T-437/08 (pending case).
73. Submissions made under the EU settlement procedure are being offered the
same protections as those granted to leniency applications, and this is welcomed as their
disclosure would provide a similar "roadmap" of the EU case.
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4. Calculation of Damages
Another bar to the development of effective damages
actions has been the issue of the calculation of the damages that
should be paid. From a plaintiffs point of view, if it can only
hope to reclaim the actual loss that it suffered, then it may
consider that it is not worth the effort and potential expense of
pursuing a claim. This concern will be especially valid in relation
to stand-alone claims where parties cannot rely on a pre-existing
decision as proof of the infringement of competition law. In
contrast, the US system, for example, considers that treble
damages and contingency fees operate to help ensure financial
return.
In terms of concrete results for victims of cartel behavior,
companies may well use the existence of a pre-existing decision
as leverage when renegotiating ongoing business agreements
with the infringing company in order to reflect the previous
damage suffered. Although this may lead to a certain level of
compensation for the customer, it does little to increase
deterrence.
A team of external economists has prepared a report for the
Commission on the quantification of antitrust damages, with a
view to producing nonbinding guidance for national courts,74 but
this does not address the policy issues regarding calculation or
passing-on. The Commission has indicated that it is "committed
to considering the possibility of suggesting simplified rules of
estimation in order to assist the claimant in proving his
damage,"75 and in practice, such flexibility would be welcomed.
Such an approach appears to have already been used successfully
within the European Union: in Hungary, for example, there is a
rebuttable presumption employed in damages actions of a ten
percent price increase due to the anticompetitive behavior.76
It should be noted that, although the Commission has not
so far advocated the use of punitive damages, it has no legal basis
74. AsSIMAKIs KOMNINOS ET AL., OXERA, QUANTIFYING ANTITRUST DAMAGES:
TOwARDs NON-BINDING GUIDANCE FOR COURTS 2009, available at http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/quantification study.pdf.
75. White Paper, supra note 37, at 165, 1 200.
76. 2009. a tisztess6gtelen piaci magatarts 6s a versenykorlitozds tilaimdr61 sz616
1996. 6vi LVII. t6rv(ny m6dosftisir61 sz616 2009. 6vi XIV. t6rv6nnyel (Act XIV of 2009
on the Amendment of Act LVII of 1996 on the Prohibition of Unfair and Restrictive
Market Practices), art. 14 (Hung.).
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to prohibit them, and Member States may provide for them if
permitted by their national legislation.
5. Timing and Delay (Again)
As discussed above, the delay before a final decision is
reached can be considerable. For companies wishing to carry out
a "follow-on" action, such litigation cannot be commenced until
there is a final Commission decision on which to base their case.
Further, once the final decision has been announced, the delay
in publishing a nonconfidential version can be considerable. For
example, the Commission's decision in Chloroprene Rubber was
published on December 5, 2007,77 and, at the time of this writing,
the full nonconfidential version of the decision is not available,
some thirty-three months later. Although the length of the delay
in this case is unusual, delays in other cases are also serious. For
example, the Commission has not yet made available a
nonconfidential version of its decision in Aluminium Fluoride,
which was decided on June 25, 2008.78
Such delays have a direct and negative effect on the ability
of potential claimants to bring follow-on damages actions in
national courts. In particular, given that the Commission's
proposed damages legislation has stalled for the time being, such
roadblocks to the pursuit of follow-on actions must be removed.
The Best Practices state the Commission's aim to publish a full
nonconfidential version of the final decision "as soon as possible,"79
and this is certainly an area in which improvement is necessary.
The Commission is taking welcomed steps to speed up the
publication of nonconfidential versions of its decisions. The Best
Practices state that, should disputes arise regarding the
extraction of business secrets, the Commission will publish a
version of the decision containing all redactions requested by the
parties pending further discussions regarding the disputed
parts.80 Provided that the delay in producing a final
nonconfidential version is short, this move is to be welcomed.
However, at the time of this writing, no provisional
77. Commission Decision Summary No. COMP/38629 (Chloroprene Rubber), 2008
O.J. C 251/7.
78. Commission Decision No. COMP/39180 (Aluminium Fluoride) (June 25, 2008).
79. DG COMPETITION, supra note 2,1 135 (emphasis added).
80. Id.
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nonconfidential version has been made available for any of the
Commission's six cartel decisions reached so far in 2010.81
B. Public and Private Enforcement: Never the Twain Shall Meet or a
New Way Forward?
That parties harmed by infringements of competition law
should be compensated for the damage suffered is a view shared
by commentators, competition authorities, and practitioners.
However, this view is often expressed subject to the caveat that
pursuit of such compensation is only to be encouraged where it
does not interfere with the effective pursuit of public
enforcement. It is submitted that this should not restrict the
Commission from exploring any potential benefits that could be
achieved through possible complementary overlaps in the aims
and impact of the public and private enforcement regimes.
Certain jurisdictions have already explored ways of creating
a relationship between compensation made to third parties and
fines imposed by competition authorities. Some have made use
of pre-existing systems such as leniency regimes, for example by
making compensation a prerequisite for obtaining a reduction in
or immunity from fines. Other jurisdictions have made
restitution to victims of the cartel a mitigating factor in
calculating the fine or have taken account of such compensation
when reaching a settlement agreement with the infringing
parties. Would any of these approaches be suitable in the
European Union?
There has been a significant amount of academic discussion
about whether there is an overlap in the objectives of the public
and private competition enforcement regimes.82 There is general
81. Commission Decision No. COMP/39309 (LCD) (Dec. 8, 2010); Commission
Decision No. COMP/39258 (Airfreight) (Nov. 9, 2010); Commission Decision No.
COMP/38866 (Animal Feed Phosphates) (July 20, 2010); Commission Decision No
COMP/38344 (Prestressing Steel) (June 30, 2010); Commission Decision No.
COMP/39092 (Bathroom Fittings and Fixtures) (June 23, 2010); Commission Decision No.
COMP/38511 (DRAM) (May 19,2010).
82. See, e.g., Donald I. Baker, Revisiting History-What Have We Learned about Private
Enforcement that We Would Recommend to Others?, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 379 (2004);
Assimakis P. Komninos, Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement in Europe: Complement?
Overlap?, 3 COMPETITION L. REV. 5 (2006); Wouter P.J. Wils, The Relationship between
Public Antitrust Enforcement and Private Actions for Damages, 32 WORLD COMPETITION 3
(2009).
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(although not necessarily total) agreement that Commission
fines are intended to, inter alia, (1) deter anticompetitive
behavior; (2) punish anticompetitive behavior; (3) have a moral
effect, reinforcing the compliant behavior of other undertakings
and individuals; (4) bring infringements to an earlier end; and
(5) facilitate corrective justice.
Regarding the objective of encouraging damages actions,
the fact that damages are granted at the Member State, rather
than the European Union, level means that there are inevitably
discrepancies and differences between the regimes about what
damages should represent. However, the Commission and the
EU courts seem to agree that damages should at least (1)
compensate victims of anticompetitive activity; (2) increase levels
of deterrence; and (3) strengthen the culture of competition
compliance. Whether damages actions serve a punitive function
is an issue that varies between Member States, as the availability
of punitive/exemplary damages is a matter for national law,83 and
is beyond the scope of this discussion.
There is therefore a certain level of overlap between the
aims of the private and public regimes, particularly in relation to
deterrence. Are there creative approaches that could be taken by
the Commission that would take both regimes into account? If
there are benefits that one system could gain without any
significant harm to the other, then surely such an avenue should
at least be explored.
When setting the level of fine to be paid by an infringing
company, the Commission could consider the extent to which it
could or should account for compensation made to third parties.
The Commission's view has been that this should not occur:
" [T] he damages to be awarded should not influence the level of
fines imposed by competition authorities in their public
enforcement activities, nor under any future framework of
enhanced private actions. Public fines and purely compensatory
damages serve two distinct objectives that are complementary."8 4
This position, however, does not consider the benefits that might
be achieved from taking damages into account when setting a
fine, such as increased levels of deterrence through increasing
83. Manfredi v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni, Case C-295/04, [2007] E.C.R. 1-6619,
1 92-93.
84. Commission Staff Working Paper, supra note 70, 1 61.
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the cost of infringing behavior and procedural efficiencies both
for the parties and for the competition authorities. There are
various ways that such a system might be structured, which are
considered below.
1. Compensation as a Mitigating Factor in Fine Calculation
Compensation might be structured as a mitigating factor in
fine calculation. This approach would afford the competition
authority a degree of flexibility, as it could assess in each case the
extent to which compensation made should count as mitigation
by considering factors such as the amount of compensation
made, the extent to which it was done of the infringing
company's own volition (rather than at the insistence of the
competition authority), and the parties to whom compensation is
made. However, the very flexibility that recommends this system
incorporates a significant level of legal uncertainty for parties
about whether mitigation would take place in a specific case. In
time, naturally, a certain level of decisional practice would build
up to provide guidance to parties.
The availability of compensation has been incorporated in
official guidance on fining levels as a mitigating factor in several
jurisdictions. In the Netherlands, the Fining Code 2007 of the
Netherlands Competition Authority ("NMa") incorporates as a
mitigating circumstance "that the offender of his own account
provided compensation to the injured party/injured parties."85
The NMa considers that this aspect of its Fining Code enables it
to "continue to foster private enforcement."8 6
The European Competition Authorities ("ECA") 87 have
agreed on principles for convergence on pecuniary sanctions on
undertakings for infringements of antitrust law, which state that
" [t] he applicable fine may be reduced if the offender takes active
steps to mitigate the adverse consequences of the infringement,
85. Boetecode van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit [Competition Authority
Fining Code], Stcrt. 2007, 196, 49(c) (Neth.).
86. NEDERLANDSE MEDEDINGINGSAUTORITEIT [NMA] [NETH. COMPETITION
AuTH.], RESPONSE OF THE NMA TO THE OFT's DISCUSSION PAPER ON PRIVATE
ENFORCEMENT 4 (June 22, 2007).
87. Founded in 2001 as a forum for discussion by the competition authorities in




424 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 34:385
in particular by providing voluntary, timely and adequate
compensation to those who have suffered damage as a result of
it."88 However, these principles are not legally binding on the
ECA, and the above recommendation is accompanied by the
comment that " [w] here compensation is taken into account as a
mitigating circumstance, this reduction should not in any case be
such as to undermine the deterrent effect of the fine."89 It is
notable that, in both the Dutch and the ECA systems, the
compensation must be made of the infringing company's own
volition.
Other jurisdictions have chosen not to incorporate such a
principle of compensation into their official guidance, but rather
to take such compensation, where made, into account on an ad
hoc basis. The Commission itself has already taken such
compensation into account in a limited amount of cases in which
the parties had made such restitution prior to the Commission
making its final infringement decision. In 1998, the Commission
granted a reduction of C5 million in the fine imposed on Asea
Brown Boveri Ltd. ("ABB") in relation to the Pre-Insulated Pipe
cartel due to ABB's "payment of substantial compensation" to a
competitor harmed by the cartel.90 However, the terms of the
settlement between ABB and its competitor remain confidential,
and it is therefore not possible to ascertain the extent to which
the reduction in fine reflects the amount of compensation paid.
In only one other case has the Commission taken the
payment of such compensation into account when setting the
fine. In the 2002 Nintendo decision, the fine was reduced by
C300,000 due to the offer of "substantial financial compensation
to third parties identified in the Statement of Objections as
having suffered financial harm as a result of Nintendo
Corporation Ltd./Nintendo of Europe GmbH's activities."'9 This
reduction in fine was limited in scope, reflecting less than three-
tenths of a percent of the basic amount of the fine. Furthermore,
88. EUROPEAN COMPETITION AUTHS., ECA WORKING GROUP ON SANCTIONS,
PECUNIARY SANCTIONS IMPOSED ON UNDERTAKINGS FOR INFRINGEMENTS OF ANTITRUST
LAW: PRINCIPLES FOR CONVERGENCE 1 18 (2008), available at http://www.nmanet.nl/
images/ECA%20Principles_tcml6-117437.pdf.
89. Id.
90. Commission Decision No. 99/60/EC (Pre-Insulated Pipe), 1999 O.J. L 24/1, 1
172.
91. Commission Decision No. 03/675/EC (Nintendo), 2003 O.J. L 255/33, 1 440.
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Nintendo offered the compensation only at the Commission's
instigation rather than entirely of its own volition.
The Commission is under no obligation to take such
restitution into account, and requests for it to do so have been
rejected on a number of occasions. In its Graphite Electrodes
decision in 2001, the Commission baldly stated that "the
possibility that undertakings may have been required to pay
damages in civil actions is of no relevance."92 It further clarified
that "[p]ayments of damages in civil actions which have the
objective of compensating for the harm caused by cartels to
individual companies or consumers cannot be compared with
public law sanctions for illegal behaviour." 93 The Court of First
Instance (now the General Court) confirmed the Commission's
position on appeal, although the judgment indicates that, for
such compensation to be taken into account, it must have been
made towards operators on the EEA market in relation to losses
suffered on that market rather than on another market.94
Although the Commission's decisional practice in this area
has been somewhat inconsistent, this does not prevent it from
taking such damages payments into consideration in future cases.
2. Compensation as Part of a Settlement Agreement between
the Competition Authority and the Infringing Party
Taking compensation into account as a factor in fine
calculation, however, is not the only way for the public and
private antitrust regimes to intertwine. Compensation could be
taken into account as part of a settlement agreement between the
competition authority and the infringing party. However,
jurisdictions have very different views as to how "settlement"
operates, and the one word covers a multitude of different
approaches. As discussed above, the Commission views settlement
mainly as a tool for obtaining procedural efficiencies once the
investigation is over, and during the development of its
92. Commission Decision No. 02/271/EC (Graphite Electrodes), 2002 O.J. L 100/1,
183.
93. Id.
94. Tokai Carbon Co. v. Commission, Joined Cases T-236, 239, 244-46, 251-52/01,
[2004] E.C.R. 11-1200, 348. However, the court did distinguish its decision from the
Commission's conclusion in Pre-Insulated Pipe, as the compensatory payments in Graphite
Electrodes had been made in respect of third parties in the United States and Canada,
rather than in the European Union, as was the case in Pre-Insulated Pipe. Id.
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settlement procedure, the Commission highlighted that it was
not seeking to replicate the "plea-bargaining" system used in the
United States.
The United Kingdom is now making increasing use of
negotiated agreements95 but has only once incorporated
consideration of payments made to third parties into its
settlement analysis and discussions. The only occasion on which
it has done so was in fact the first case in which the OFT
negotiated an agreed settlement in an infringement decision
procedure. In its decision relating to exchange of information on
future fees by certain independent fee-paying schools, published
in December 2006, the OFT considered that there were a
"number of exceptional features of the case" that justified
departure from its penalties guidance, one of which was payment
made by the addressees of the OFT's decision designed to benefit
the victims of the competition law infringement:
Secondly, and unusually, the OFT notes that the Participant
schools agreed to make an ex gratia payment to fund a £3
million educational trust fund for the benefit of pupils who
attended the Participant schools during the academic years
in respect of which fee information was exchanged, thus
indirectly benefiting those whose interests the Act is
designed to protect.96
This decision may well be considered exceptional and is
certainly open to criticism, 9 7 but it presents an interesting option.
Using settlement in this way would again provide a certain level
95. As seen, for example, in cases involving tobacco and the dairy sector.
96. OFT, Exchange of Information on Future Fees by Certain Independent Fee-
Paying Schools, Infringement Decision No. CA98/05/2006, 1 1427 (Nov. 20, 2006),
available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared-oft/ca98_public-register/decisions/schools.
pdf.
97. Criticisms include (1) the limited fine of UKY1O,000 imposed on each of the
implicated schools (except The Royal Hospital School, which is legally protected by
Crown immunity); (2) the fact that the educational trust into which the sums were paid
was intended to benefit those pupils at the schools at the time of the infringement and
therefore not those that suffered financial damage due to the infringement (i.e., for the
most part, the parents of those pupils); and (3) the fact that fines for competition
infringements are generally intended for the public purse. (In the European Union,
fines paid contribute to the Community budget and serve to decrease the payments by
Member States. In the United Kingdom, fines paid contribute to the revenues of the
state via the consolidated tax fund.) The question could therefore be raised as to
whether the OFT was in fact acting ultra vires in reducing the fine on the schools due to
the ex gratia payment.
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of flexibility for both the competition authority and the settling
parties, as well as some potential protection of confidential
information for those parties. However, this very absence of
transparency may pose concerns because it could render further
follow-on actions more difficult by leading to less information in
the final decision, or, if part of the infringement were dropped
and not covered in the final agreement, by forcing private parties
to litigate certain elements of the infringement as a "stand-alone"
action.
3. Compensation as a Requirement for Immunity or Leniency
from Fines to Be Granted
Another option for creating a relationship between
compensation made to third parties and fines imposed by
competition authorities would be to make compensation a
requirement for immunity or leniency from fines to be granted
under the leniency program. Although this is not strictly a
reduction in fine due to compensation paid, the outcome for the
leniency applicant would be similar.
A number of jurisdictions have chosen to explore this
option. In the United States, the Department ofJustice's ("DOJ")
corporate leniency policy includes as a condition of leniency that
" [w]here possible, the corporation makes restitution to injured
parties."98 In practice, it appears that private litigation is often
accepted as a substitute for restitution, and in such cases the DOJ
does not actively manage the process of restitution, but instead
simply accepts the assurance from the leniency applicant. A
document issued by the DOJ in 2008 states that "the applicant
must demonstrate to the Division that it has satisfied its
obligation to pay restitution before it will be granted final
leniency. Restitution is normally resolved through civil actions
with private plaintiffs."99
Obviously, the system of fines and compensation in the
United States differs significantly from that in the European
Union. In the United States, it is likely that damages actions will
98. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY 1J A(5), B(6) (1993),
available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0091.pdf.
99. SCOTT D. HAMMOND & BELINDA A. BARNETr, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS REGARDING ANTITRUST LENIENCY PROGRAM 20 (Nov.
19, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/criminal/239583.pdf.
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already be underway by the time the DOJ has completed its
investigation, whereas this would not necessarily be the same in a
Commission investigation.
Although such an approach has not been successful in all
jurisdictions,100 there would seem to be some benefits to
incorporating any reductions granted due to restitution made
within the auspices of a pre-existing leniency regime. Quite
simply, if making compensation available is a pre-condition of
being granted leniency from fines, then companies wishing to
obtain leniency will have no choice but to make compensation
available. Companies that apply for leniency are aware that any
grant of leniency brings with it significant obligations of
continuous cooperation, and adding restitution to the list of
obligations could be viewed as simply another (albeit significant)
condition to satisfy. The competition authority will obtain the
evidential information and increased cooperation that it can
expect from a leniency applicant, and the damaged parties will
receive compensation. This would seem to achieve a certain level
of efficiency. There may also be practical benefits for the
plaintiffs. Under the US system, in order for the immunity
applicant to qualify for single, rather than treble damages, it
must cooperate with the plaintiffs in their civil actions by
providing a full account of the relevant facts and providing
reasonable access to documents and witnesses. 101
Further, it would seem logical to conclude that those
companies willing to voluntarily compensate victims are those
most likely to have already applied for leniency. Certainly,
companies not applying for leniency and planning to appeal any
infringement decision against them are unlikely to make
compensation voluntarily available as this could be viewed as an
admission of its involvement in the cartel. If this assumption is
correct, then there would again appear to be a level of efficiency
in incorporating restitution within the leniency program.
However, the Commission will be concerned to ensure
preservation of the key role played by the leniency system,
considered to be the linchpin of its anti-cartel enforcement
100. The leniency programs of both Australia and Canada previously included
similar conditions, which have since been removed.
101. Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-237, § 213, 118 Stat. 661, 666-67.
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regime. If making compensation available becomes a
requirement of leniency, it would likely be more difficult for a
company to assess the cost-benefit analysis of applying for
leniency, but the Commission has made clear that it does not
wish companies to be able to conduct too reliable a cost-benefit
analysis, as ability to calculate risk in advance will weaken the
deterrent element of fines.
In the unlikely case that leniency were to be revoked or fall
away for some reason, perhaps the restitution requirement
should still remain, and such restitution could then be taken into
account as a mitigating factor when calculating the fine,
dependent perhaps on the behavior of the party in question and
the reason for leniency being revoked.
As mentioned above, there is a question about whether the
liability position should be any different for recipients of full
immunity from fines. In relation to follow-on damages actions, it
has been suggested in the Commission's White Paper on
damages actions that immunity recipients should not be
considered jointly and severally liable. In the United States,
immunity recipients are placed in the privileged position of
being exposed in civil actions to only single, rather than treble,
damages. The arguments for offering protection from paying
compensation are similar to those raised in relation to protecting
immunity recipients from damages actions-i.e., that they are
likely to be the first to offer such compensation and may
therefore end up paying proportionally more than other parties
to the cartel. However, this concern may be limited if each
infringing party is obliged to compensate only those that it has
harmed (rather than all victims of the cartel).
On balance, a system linking damages with leniency may
well have advantages and need not necessarily be a permanent
fixture. Perhaps such a system might best be used only in the
medium term, and could be rethought once an active private
plaintiffs' bar is operational in the European Union and a
significant number of private actions are being brought in
national courts.
V. MOVING FORWARD: ARE WE ON THE RIGHT PATH?
Many aspects of the Commission's current anti-cartel
enforcement procedure are good. But this does not mean that
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they could not be better. Any authority, particularly one that can
impose such severe sanctions, should strive to ensure that its
procedures are as fair, transparent, and justifiable as possible.
DG Competition has taken, and continues to take,
significant steps to ensure that its procedure and process evolve,
and it shows an increasing willingness to listen to and take on
suggestions from practitioners for improving tweaks to current
practice. Such developments are very welcome but do not
alleviate concern about resistance to suggestions of more
fundamental and structural change. With the increasing
protection of fundamental rights as a clear impetus, the
Commission has a genuine opportunity to reflect upon its
practices and structure and to ensure that it takes strides to make
them as fair as possible.
The Commission's reaction to criticism of its systems is often
somewhat defensive, referring to the various checks and balances
that it has in place. But checks on a flawed system are of limited
benefit, more so when they are internal to the system. The level
of oversight of the Commission's investigations must be visibly
improved: "[I] t is not merely of some importance but is of
fundamental importance that justice should not only be done,
but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done."10 2
Regarding the encouragement of private damages actions, it
is sincerely hoped that the Commission's draft directive has only
stumbled and not fallen. Harmonizing legislation for plaintiffs
needs to facilitate and encourage good settlements, establishing
good judicial procedures that enable plaintiffs to bring cases and
defendants to know what to expect.
The EU's system of anti-cartel enforcement is respected and
emulated around the globe, and the eyes of both mature and
developing regimes are on it to see how it will respond to the
criticisms levied. But "[h]e has a right to criticize, who has a
heart to help," 03 and it is hoped that some of the thoughts and
suggestions provided in this Essay may help contribute to the
discussion of how a good system can be made better and more
just.
102. R v. Sussex Justices, [1924] 1 KB. 256, 259 (Lord Hewart C.J.) (Eng.)
(emphasis added).
103. Quoting US President Abraham Lincoln. See A.N.P. UMMERKuTIY, WORDS OF
WISDOM AND QUOTABLE QUOTES 30 (2d ed. 2005).
